Hey, Blaine: the Warren Commission said Rowley "runs a second-rate agency and doesn’t want his deficiencies to be exposed"

Hey, Blaine: the Warren Commission said Rowley "runs a second-rate agency and doesn’t want his deficiencies to be exposed"

Thanks to researcher Pat Speer for this: "You should look through Howard Willens' journal, Vince. The SS' poor performance was on the minds of the commission, and they seriously considered recommending the SS lose its presidential protection responsibilities. Dulles was a big supporter of this, if I recall. There is also a discussion of a Rowley report, which was apparently quite damaging to the SS, that the WC considered a hot potato. Willens has published his journal on his website, Vince. It goes into far more detail than the book...the "Rowley Report" was a recommendation for a major overhaul of the SS.
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Don't worry, Pat- my goal is to show the world Blaine's true colors. I receive messages all over the world from people who now know Blaine's book is fiction.

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My message to Mr. Willens:
Dear Mr. Willens,
I saw you on C-SPAN recently and was impressed with your presentation with the surviving staff members of the Warren Commission. Unlike most of my "brethren", I have a very open mind and won't jump off a bridge if Oswald acted alone (in fact, I enthusiastically endorsed Vincent Bugliosi's book for a time).
That said, I hope you find the time to read my book. Simply put, you and the Chief Justice were deceived: the Secret Service lied to you- JFK never ordered the agents off his limousine and much of what they related to the Commission was firmly in the CYA area. America loves heroes, even false ones like Clint Hill, who drank the night before, was late getting to the limo than "advertised", and actually did nothing to protect anyone, as Jackie got in and out of the car of her own volition. In WWII, medals weren't given for ATTEMPTS to succeed but for SUCCESSES ("Private Smith, your comrade was killed under your watch, but here's a Silver Star for your attempt"...spare me).
I have been a thorn in the side of Blaine and Hill for a few years now- they know I am on to them: Blaine was one of many agents to tell me that JFK never interfered with their actions at all. Behn and Boring, the "brass" of the White House Detail, totally contradicted their reports submitted to the Commission by Rowley in taped conversations with myself, years before Blaine's book (written BECAUSE of my research) was even a thought.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Sincerely,
Vince Palamara


WARREN COMMISSION MEMBER HOWARD WILLENS:

     

 

From March 9, 1964

Shortly after this the Chief Justice received a telephone call
and left the room and Mr. McCloy addressed a question to me regarding
the Commission’s function in this area.  I made a strong statement to
Mr. McCloy expressing my personal views, which I suggested were generally
those of the staff on this subject.  I emphasized the amount of time that
had already passed without any work being done in this area, the need
to gain access to detailed information before any recommendations could
be made, and the fact that the Commission is missing a great and unique
opportunity to make a substantial contribution in the field of security
precautions.  Either in the course of this conversation or later when
the Chief Justice returned to the room, I made reference to the Rowley
report to the Secretary of the Treasury.  I may well have overstated
the extent to which this document referred to the events of the
assassination, but I did indicate that Rowley had set forth detailed
criticism of Secret Service operations and proposed certain
recommendations for improvements in the areas of interest to the Com-
mission.  This was the first time the Chief Justice had ever heard of
this report and he was obviously disconcerted that it had not been
submitted to the Commission.  When he returned to the room the Chief
Justice and Mr. McCloy engaged in a heated discussion of the report and
all the rest of us sat quietly.  The two men disagreed rather sharply.
Mr. McCloy expressed his view that the Commission should get access
to all the relevant materials from Secret Service and then agree to
consult with them regarding publishing of these prior to the final
report.  According to Mr. McCloy, any debate on this matter could be
resolved by the President at the appropriate time.  The Chief Justice
responded that this would put the President on the spot and that if
he decided not to release any of this material he would be accused
of covering up the investigation of the assassination.  The other
major concern of the Chief Justice was the fear that if detailed
information was made known to the members of the Commission and
staff they would be primary suspects in the event of any leak which
resulted in another assassination attempt.  This discussion ended at
approximately 5:30 or 6 p.m.

From March 11, 1964

The most important meeting in which I participated
Wednesday was a meeting Wednesday afternoon with Mr. Carswell,
Chief  Rowley, the Chief Justice, Mr. Rankin, Mr. Stern and myself.
This meeting was called in response to the Chief Justice’s request
that he have an opportunity to discuss personally with Treasury
representatives the matters discussed the prior Friday and with
Mr. McCloy the previous day.  It was a unique meeting in that I
remained quiet from beginning to end.  This proved to be a wise course
of action.  The Chief Justice opened the meeting with approximately
a 15-minute presentation in which he stated precisely where he stood
in the area of security precautions.  He repeated the points that he
had made on prior occasions regarding his disinterest in detail and
his concern in putting the President on the spot.  After he indicated
his position so clearly, Chief Rowley could do nothing but agree

enthusiastically.  Chief Rowley made many digressions into operations
of his Service, most of them irrelevant to the functions of this
Commission, but seemingly designed to prove to the Chief Justice
the wisdom of his action. For example, Chief Rowley made reference
to the efforts made by foreign governments and others to inquire into
the actions of the Secret Service and his efforts to restrict these
efforts. It seemed clear that Chief Rowley, even more than I might
have expected, is reluctant to expose his present procedures to the
scrutiny of the President’s Commission.  Competent as he may be, he
gives the impression of being a very average law enforcement official
who runs a second-rate agency and doesn’t want his deficiencies to be
exposed.  During the course of the conversation he made reference, for example
to the infiltration of the “syndicates” into counterfeiting and suggested
that this was another reason why the Commission should not become informed
regarding his operations.  As far as I was concerned this was just baloney.

          Mr. Carswell made some effort to define the issue, but only
succeeded in getting Mr. McCloy and Mr. Carswell’s boss, Secretary Dillon,
into greater disfavor with the Chief Justice.  Finally, Mr. Carswell
stated that Mr. McCloy had seen Secretary Dillon at the Secretary’s
request, when it became clear that the Chief Justice was somewhat
disturbed that this matter had been discussed in his absence by
another member of the Commission and the Secretary. The Chief Justice
reaffirmed his decision not to be exposed to the matters contained in
the Rowley report to the Secretary which looks toward the future.
Mr. Carswell made a strong statement to the effect that the procedures
and issues related to Dallas and the assassination could be isolated
from the procedures and issues looking to the improvements in the
operations of the Secret Service.  The Chief Justice bought this
completely. (After the meeting, which took about one hour and
fifteen minutes, I expressed my views to Mr. Carswell and discussed that
this distinction probably would not hold up.)  The end result of the
meeting was that Mr. Stern was instructed to work with Mr. Carswell and
prepare a series of questions and answers which would develop for the
Commission the information it needed to know in this area.  The
memorandum of the conference in my chrono file dated March 13, 1964
sets forth the decision reached at the conference. So far as I am
concerned it makes the Commission a public relations adjunct to the
Treasury and makes it impossible for the Commission to do any
significant work in this field.

          When I discussed the meeting subsequently with
Mr. Rankin he characteristically had somewhat more optimistic view.
He and I both think that any progress is all to the good and that
the question and answer routine may serve to (1) supply the
Commission with certain information of value and (2) highlight the
issues more sharply so that they may be discussed further.  Mr. Rankin
still hasn’t given up in this area and for this I am grateful.  If
this next step can be taken in a short period of time it is possible
that the full Commission may be able to discuss this matter and come
to a conclusion contrary to that of the Chief Justice.

From May 5, 1964

During this same meeting I asked Mr. Rankin what was
decided about Mr. Stern’s area.  The Commission had decided at
its  April 30 meeting that we could go further into the area of
Presidential protection than had been contemplated by the Chief
Justice.  But the decision was apparently made, however, that
material such as the Rowley report and other studies under way
at Treasury should be made available only to Mr. Rankin and not
to members of the staff.  After some discussion of this Mr. Rankin
authorized Mr. Stern to prepare a letter to Secretary Dillon
setting forth the arrangements upon which the Commission desired
to have access to these studies and related materials.  Mr. Rankin
indicated that he hoped to persuade the Commission to let him
designate a member of the staff to assist him in this area.

From June 16, 1964

Area 6.  I reported to Mr. Rankin and Mr. Redlich
Mr. Stern’s current position.  Mr. Stern is currently in the process
of drafting his section on recommendation in the area of Presidential
Protection.  After Chief Rowley testifies on June 18 he plans to
incorporate this material into his report and plans to have his
Final Report during the week of June 22. I mentioned to Mr. Rankin
and Mr. Redlich my belief that the Commission had to deal with the
question of transferring the responsibilities of the Secret Service
to the FBI in the field of Presidential Protection.  Neither of them
seemed particularly enthused about discussing this issue in the
Report.

July 2, 1964

    During the morning the Commission met to consider

those questions which it had not decided at its meeting on Monday.

According to Mr. Rankin’s later report of the meeting there were

no major problems except perhaps in the area of Presidential

protection.  It was during this meeting,  I believe,  that there was

discussion of the transfer problem and Mr. Rankin told me that two

of the seven Commissioners were inclined to recommend the transfer

of the Presidential protection function to the Department of Justice.

I know that one of the two is Mr. Dulles [former CIA Director] and I think that the other is Congressman [and future President] Ford.  Either at this meeting or later it was decided

by the Commission to attempt to reconcile these differences and

express no view on the question of transfer.  It was decided by the

Chief Justice, at least, that the Commission should disavow its

competence to consider this proposal.

 

August 21, 1964

 

Late in the day I reviewed with Mr.  Rankin the current

status of the work of the Commission and he reported to me the result

of the Commission meeting that day.   He said that there was a split on the

Commission as to the question of giving to the FBI the responsibility

for the protection of the  President.   Apparently at least Congressman

Ford and Mr.  Dulles felt that PRS is not adequate to do the job.  The

two remaining members of the Commission,  The Chief Justice and

Mr. McCloy disagreed on this issue.   According to Mr.  Rankin,

Mr. McCloy was drafting some language which he hoped would

bridge the gap and which he would bring to the next Commission

meeting,  scheduled for Wednesday,  the 26th.

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